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We present a simple dynamical model for describing trading interactions between agents in a social network
by considering only two dynamical variables, namely money and goods or services, that are assumed conserved
over the whole time span of the agents’ trading transactions. A key feature of the model is that agent-to-agent
transactions are governed by the price in units of money per goods, which is dynamically changing, and by
a trust variable, which is related to the trading history of each agent. All agents are able to sell or buy, and
the decision to do either has to do with the level of trust the buyer has in the seller, the price of the goods and
the amount of money and goods at the disposal of the buyer. Here we show the results of extensive numerical
calculations under various initial conditions in a random network of agents and compare the results with the
available related data. In most cases the agreement between the model results and real data turns out to be fairly
good, which allow us to draw some general conclusions as how different trading strategies could affect the
distribution of wealth in different kinds of societies.
Keywords: social networks, agent-based model, wealth distribution, nonlinear dynamical systems, price
effects, trust, reputation
I. INTRODUCTION
In human societies social life consists of the flow and ex-
change of norms, values, ideas, goods as well as other social
and cultural resources, which are channeled through a network
of interconnections. In all the social relations between people
trust is a fundamental component [1], such that the quality
of the dyadic relationships reflects the level of trust between
them. From the personal perspective social networks can be
considered structured in a series of layers whose sizes are
determined by person’s cognitive constraints and frequency
and quality of interactions [2], which in turn correlate closely
with the level of trust that the dyad of individuals share. As
one moves from the inner to the outer layers of an individ-
ual’s social network, emotional closeness diminishes, as does
trust. Despite its key role in economics, sociology, and so-
cial psychology, the detailed psychological and social mech-
anisms that underpin trust remain open. In order to provide
a systematic framework to understand the role of trust, one
needs to create metrics or quantifiable measures as well as
models for describing plausible mechanisms producing com-
plex emergent effects due to social interactions of the people
in an interconnected societal structure.
One example of such social interaction phenomena, in
which trust plays an important role, is trading between buyers
and sellers. Such an economic process is influenced by many
apparently disconnected factors, which make it challenging to
devise a model that takes them into account. Therefore, mod-
els that have been proposed, necessarily select a subset of fac-
tors considered important for the phenomena to be described.
For instance, there are studies of income and wealth distribu-
tion [3, 4], using gas like models [5], life-cycle models [6],
game models [7], and so on. For a review of various agent
based models we refer to [8]. In addition, we note that de-
tailed studies of empirical data and analysis of the distribution
functions [9] seem to lend strong support in favour of gas-like
models for describing economic trading exchanges.
In order to consider the role of trust in trading relations we
focus on the simplest possible situation in which trust clearly
plays a definite role. This is the case of trading goods or
services for money through dyadic interactions or exchange,
which takes place either as a directional flow of resources
from one individual to another individual or vice versa. When
an agent is buying, trust plays a role, as people prefer to buy
from a reliable and reputable selling agent, i.e. agent they
trust. It should be noted that the dyadic relationship does not
have to be symmetric, i.e. a seller does not need to trust the
buyer. A key ingredient in the trading interactions is profit that
an agent makes when providing goods or services, and it can
realistically be assumed that a seller wants to put the highest
possible price to its goods, while the buyer tends to perform
operations with agents offering a low price.
In this study we propose an agent based ”gas-like” model
to take into account the above mentioned important features
of trading. The model describes dyadic transactions between
agents in a random network. The amount of goods and money
are considered conserved in time, but the price of goods and
trust, we measure as reputation, vary according to the specific
situation in which trade is made. In section II we describe
the model and set up the dynamic equations of the system. In
section III we present the results of extensive numerical cal-
culations and explore their dependence on the parameters of
the model. Here we also compare our numerical results with
available real data and discuss the predictions of the model
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2as well as possible extensions to it. Finally, in section IV we
conclude by making remarks concerning the role of trust in
trade and social relations.
II. THE MODEL
A. The basic model
First we introduce the basic model, which describes the dy-
namic development of a random network of N agents such
that the state of agent i is defined by two time-dependent state
variables, (xi, yi), where xi stands for the amount of money
and yi for the amount of goods or services. The pairwise
connectivities between agents in the network are described by
N ×N adjacency matrix C. It is necessary to distinguish the
direction of the flow of goods and money in the network, since
agent i could buy from agent j, or vice versa. At time t = 0
we define two symmetric matrices, A(t = 0) and B(t = 0),
with an average of Z/2 random entries per row, for the flow
of money or goods, respectively. Then the adjacency matrix
is simply C = A+B, and Z stands for the mean degree.
The elements of A(t) and B(t) are defined as the nor-
malised probabilities of transactions per unit time α and β,
respectively and they could become asymmetric. These ma-
trices represent the buying or selling transactions, according
to the individual agent instantaneous situation.
The dynamic equations for the state variables x (money)
and y (goods) initialised randomly ∈ [0, 1] are,
dxi
dt
=
∑
j
[−xiβij − sjyjαji + xjβji + siyiαij , ] (1a)
dyi
dt
=
∑
j
[
xiβij
sj
+ yjαji − xjβji
si
− yiαij
]
. (1b)
where si is the price of the goods as decided by seller i, and
its value depends on time. In both Eqs. (1) the first and second
terms on the right represent the transactions in which agent i
is buying goods from agent j. Note that there is an outflow of
money (negative βij) and an inflow of goods (negative αji).
The third and last terms represent selling goods to j. Observe
that we could simply use the first and third terms in Eq. (1a), to
represent the exchange of money, or use the second and fourth
terms, if the exchanged money is represented as its transaction
value sy (s has units of money per unit good). The same rea-
soning is applied to Eq. (1b). We preferred to keep the equa-
tions in a symmetric form as regards to goods and money.
The elements of the matrices α and β in the equations rep-
resent the proportion of money and goods, respectively, that
an agent is distributing amongst its links in a given transac-
tion. Therefore, the simplest expressions for the correspond-
ing transaction coefficients are linear functions of the respec-
tive variables, thus we propose,
αij(t) =
1
∆t
xjΘ(siyi − xj)∑
j xjΘ(siyi − xj)
,
βij(t) =
1
∆t
yjΘ(xi − sjyj)∑
j yjΘ(xi − sjyj)
,
(2)
provided
∑
iAij 6= 0 for α and
∑
iBij 6= 0 for β, respec-
tively. The unit time ∆t could conveniently be taken as one.
The reason to include the Heaviside functions Θ is that agent
i buys goods from agent j only if it has enough money to pay
for the price agent j is asking for its goods (in βij) or if agent
j has enough goods to satisfy agent i (in αji). By the same
token, agent i cannot sell to agent j if it has not enough goods
(as in αij) or if the buyer has not enough money (as in βji).
The diagonal elements of these matrices represent the quan-
tity of money or goods that are not used in the transaction. If
they are set to zero, all the money that an agent has is used
in all the transactions, meaning that there are no savings. The
elements of these matrices cannot be negative, hence, when-
ever an element is about to become negative, it should be set
to zero, which is equivalent to say that the link between agents
is irrelevant for that particular transaction.This amounts to re-
shaping the trading network.
These dynamical equations constitute the basic model for
trading transactions. It should be noted that the model con-
serves the amount of goods (
∑
i xi) and money (
∑
i yi). This
restriction could be easily relaxed, if needed, by adding up
sources and sinks to the equations. We decided to keep the
conserved version for simplicity.
B. Trust is built from reputation
As emphasised above trust plays a key role in all social and
trading transactions. In order to include trust into the transac-
tions, we need first to assume that trust is something that you
either gain or lose with time. Therefore, it has to be related to
a quantity that measures the performance of agents as traders,
which we here assume to be reputation Ri(t). Accordingly,
we write
Ri(t) =
Ri(t)
maxi{R(t)} , where
Ri(t) =
∫ t
0
N∑
j=1
[αij(t
′) + αji(t′) + βij(t′) + βji(t′)] dt′.
(3)
Observe that the numerator of Eq. (3) at a given time in-
creases with the number of successful transactions, since the
elements of the trading matrices α and β are positive definite.
In order to maintain the scale of variation of all the variables
between zero and one, we normalise the variable R by divid-
ing it with the maximum value of R, encountered in the net-
work. Note that the reputation of a given agent could decrease
in time because of the time dependent normalisation.
Let us now introduce a non-symmetrical matrix F , whose
elements Fij regulate the amount of goods and money in each
3transaction between a pair of agents. The entries of the matrix
F range from zero (no transaction possible) to unity (larger
amount of goods and money exchanged). We assume that
agent i prefers to buy if the value of the goods in its possession
is smaller than the amount of money it has, and favours sell-
ing otherwise, in order to maintain a balanced stock of money
and goods, and the same for agent j. To reflect this, one could
define the matrix elements of F as follows,
Fij(t) = RjΘ(sˆ(t)yi(t)− xi(t)). (4)
where sˆ(t) is the average price over the whole network of the
goods at time t, which could be very different from the price
the individual i is pricing its goods. Here it is assumed that
agent i is buying from agent j, and therefore the reputation
of agent j is the factor that matters. Trust on sellers when
buying is important because one buys from a reliable agents
only. On the contrary, when selling one is happy to do it to
whomever is able to pay, independently of the reputation of
the buyer. Note that the transpose Fji, should be used on the
transactions in which agent i sells goods, in which case the
reputation of agent i matters.
Taking this new feature into account, the dynamical equa-
tions of our model read as follows,
dxi
dt
=
∑
j
[−xiβijFij − sjyjαjiFij
+xjβjiFji + siyiαijFji, ] ,
dyi
dt
=
∑
j
[
xiβijFij
sj
+ yjαjiFij
−xjβjiFji
si
− yiαijFji
]
.
(5)
Notice that these model equations reduce to those of the
basic model (Eqs. (1)) if one eliminates the effect of trust by
setting Fij = Fji,= 1, ∀i, j. In this sense, the effect of trust
is to regulate the amount of goods and money exchanged in
each transaction, but also in deciding if one sells or buys.
C. Evolution of prices s(t)
The main quantity that regulates the dynamics of goods and
money in our trading model is the time dependence of the
price of the goods. Therefore, one needs to suggest a mech-
anism by which an agent modifies the price of its goods. We
assume that in general people would like to sell at the high-
est possible price, but we need to consider to what extend it
is limited by the agent’s reputation. If the agent is reputed to
be a successful trader, it could increase its prices by a large
amount, provided that the price the agent i is using is smaller
than the average price the agents connected to it are offering,
otherwise lowering the value of si is a way of attracting more
transactions. In a mathematical language, one can represent
this situation by the following coupled first order equations,
dτi
dt
= − 1
t0
Ri(t)
si(t)− 1
ki
ki∑
j=1
sj(t)
 ,
= − 1
t0
Ri(t)
[
si(t)− ski (t)
]
,
dsi
dt
=
1
t0
[Riτi(t)− gsi(t)] ,
(6)
where τi is a variable that enables agent i to decide how to
modify its prices according to trust and the information avail-
able to it. The parameter t0 is the time scale for price changes
and g is a constant that represents reluctance for the agent to
lower the prices, which for simplicity is assumed to be very
small and the same for all the agents.
We can eliminate the variable τ from this equations and
obtain a second order equation for s, which we identify as a set
of damped harmonic oscillators, which admits an analytical
solution, namely,
si(t) = si(0)e
−γt
[
cos(ωit)− γ
ωi
sin(ωit)
]
+ ski (t), (7)
where γ = g/2 and ωi =
√
(4R2i − g2)/2. Notice that this
solution is approximate and valid only when the prices do not
change appreciably within a time step dt, which means that
t0 is large and g is small. In any case one could find the so-
lution of this non-linear system of coupled oscillators numeri-
cally. The solutions of Eqs. (6) produce an apparently chaotic
behaviour for s(t) showing qualitatively similar to the price
variations of real markets (there are even some models of the
stock market that use damped oscillators to analyse the price
variation [10]).
III. RESULTS.
The numerical calculations were made in a random network
of 500 agents with the average degree of 12, using a simple
Euler method with random initial conditions for x, and y ∈
[0, 1]. The appropriate step size for convergence was found to
be dt = 0.05, reached within 200000 iterations. At time t = 0
we set s(0) randomly using a flat distribution with the mean
s¯ = 1.2 and the width ds = 0.4, and set a time scale t0 = 400
and g = dt/t0. For this t0 the system reaches dynamical
equilibrium within the running time. The diagonal elements
of the trading matrices A(t) and B(t) were set to zero.
In Fig. 1 we depict the structure of the final network by
showing only the active links, where the height of the 3D
plot is stratified according to the wealth of the agent i, i.e.
wi = xi + yi. Here it is seen that there are poor agents and
only a few very rich ones. In addition we observed in numer-
ous calculations that if the width of the distribution of prices
is increased, the rich become richer and the number of poor
agents increases.
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FIG. 1: Final configuration of an active trading network of buyers
and sellers when trust is included in trading transactions. The colour
code for the links between agents is as follows: Blackα 6= 0 and β 6=
0, Red α 6= 0 and β = 0, and Blue α = 0 and β 6= 0. The colour of
the nodes is chosen according to the wealth (wi = xi + yi) such that
light green, red, dark green, blue, grey, black are in decreasing order
of w.
In Fig. 2 we show the time histories of the variables for
the typical calculation of the previous figure. Note that
most agents have converged to certain amounts of money and
goods, but the ones who posses more wealth are prevented
from taking it all, which is an effect of trust. Also observe os-
cillations of prices and apparently chaotic behaviour of trust.
With the chosen value of g (reluctance for the agent to lower
the prices) the average price is maintained around a constant
value, but with increasing g the average price diminishes, be-
cause one is less reluctant to lower its prices. If all prices are
set to the same value, the dynamical behaviour of R turns out
to be less chaotic, and shows less variations.
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FIG. 2: The time histories of the variables for amounts of traders’
or agents’ money and goods, and prices of goods and sellers’ reputa-
tions.
In Fig. 3 the behaviour of the average reputation of sellers
and price of goods are depicted. Here we see that the mean
value of reputation of agents decreases with time, which re-
flects the fact that there are less successful transactions, while
the reputation of some selected individuals increases with
time.
In order to assess the effect of including trust in the transac-
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FIG. 3: The time histories of the average price of goods and reputa-
tion of sellers in the network.
tions, we made a calculation in which no trust variables were
included, that is Fij(t) = 1 and Ri = 1, ∀(i, t), and another
calculation including the dynamics of the trust variables. In
Fig. 4 we show a representation of the network as in Fig. 1
and a 2D graph of the two calculations.
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FIG. 4: Results of a typical network in which no trust variables are
included (left hand side of the vertical black line), and including trust
dynamics (right hand side). The yellow lines represent inactive links.
Here we observe that trust has two main effects: 1) it re-
inforces the trade network, the number of active links is in-
creased noticeably, while in the calculation without trust (in-
discriminate trading) the network is dismembered in isolated
subgraphs with very few active links. 2) The wealth distribu-
tion between agents turns out to be more fair, in the sense that
there are less poor people and quite a large proportion in the
5middle class. The backbone network, in which active trading
took place, is noticeably larger and with more ”black” or ac-
tive interactions (α and β 6= 0), the dramatic effect of trust
is: A disconnected trading network without trust becomes a
robust and connected network when trust is affecting agents
in deciding transactions.
We have also observed that in the calculations with trust
the state variables remain positive or zero, while in the calcu-
lations without trust a small number of agents have negative
values. This means that these agents are not only poor but in
debt but the number of such agents is very small, such that on
average there are 160 agents with negative values in a popula-
tion of 5000 agents after 200000 time steps.
As one of our main research foci we compare the distri-
bution of wealth calculated from our model with that of the
actual statistical data. For comparison we depict in Fig. 5
the histograms of the actual wealth distribution in the USA
(in blue), together with our results from 10 realisations of the
network with 500 agents, without and with trust included. It
should be noted that our model predicts a concentration of
wealth in the hands of few agents, regardless of the role of
trust, although the concentration of such agents is much less
pronounced than what we see in reality. In the calculation
including trust the distribution amongst middle and bottom
percentages agree quantitatively with the data, but we are not
able to find a good match with data for the upper 40% of the
wealth. This could be due to the small size and randomness of
our model network, nevertheless the trend is already notice-
able.
In Ref. [11] one finds an interesting exercise in which peo-
ple are asked to construct wealth distribution that they con-
sider ideal, and also an estimated distribution, based on their
information, and these data are compared with actual data for
wealth distribution in the USA. In Fig. 6 we compare the pub-
lished results with our calculations.
Here we find that our calculation results seem to compare
very well with the ideal distribution when trust is included
and no spread of prices is allowed. This situation probably
represents a country that has strict control of unique prices
for goods, set by the government or some monopoly. The
estimated distribution is well reproduced with a rather small
spread of prices and having trust included. However, the ac-
tual situation is somewhat disappointing, since the best fit is
with a large spread of prices. In the bottom right panel we
show the situation in which the network agents lack trust in
their transactions thus rendering the outcome unrealistic.
The situation is quite different for such egalitarian soci-
eties as Denmark, in which case we have found that for very
small spread of prices and including trust our model agrees
extremely well with the actual data (taken from [12]) of the
income distribution for the 1992 statistics. Using data from
the money variable only, we show the comparison in Fig. 7,
which turns out to be very favourable.
Another maybe better way to compare our results with real
statistical data is to investigate the distribution of money in
different systems, since it depends on the actual mechanisms
of acquiring money. For instance, there are data on the annual
income of people in Europe, which ranges from 0 to millions
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FIG. 5: Wealth distribution in the USA (in blue, taken from [13])
and numerically calculated wealth distribution from our model (in
yellow) including trust (top) and without including it (bottom). In
both calculations the average price was s¯ = 1.2 and the spread ds =
0.4.
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(in blue, taken from [11]) compared with numerically calculated
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of euros. In Fig. 8(a) we compare the actual data (in red)
with a histogram from our numerical calculation with 1000
agents but without including trust. In Fig. 8(b) we compare
the same data with the results of a calculation with 250 agents
and a dispersion of prices twice as large as in (a) but once
again without including trust. Both these calculations do not
seem to fit with the real data, neither do averages over many
realisations.
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FIG. 7: Actual income distribution in Denmark (1992) (in blue,
taken from [12]) compared with numerically calculated wealth dis-
tribution from our model (in yellow) with trust included and having
a price spread of ds = 0.02.
However, a rather different situation is encountered in a
closed system as we have found out when we investigated data
from the annual salaries that all the players in the NFL earned
in two different years. In Fig. 8(c) we show in red the distribu-
tion of salaries in 1998 and compare it with a numerical result
without including trust. In Fig. 8(d) we show the numerical
results for the same system including trust and compare them
with the NLF data from 2011. Here we can observe that both
distributions fit the data fairly well, which allows us to think
that trust does not play much of a role in the mechanisms of
deciding salaries in a system like NFL, in which a few of the
star players began to receive exaggeratedly good salaries.
In order to investigate such a situation in more detail we
have adopted the approach presented by Jun-ichi Inoue et al.
[14], in which they define indices to measure social inequality
in various fields, including income and trading. In Fig. 9 we
present the inequality for our model calculations. We see that
these Lorentz inequality curves vary quite sensitively with the
spread of prices of the goods. We also see that the real situ-
ation presents itself as rather unequal such that for the same
spread of prices, the lack of trust generates more inequity. For
the curve tagged with an arrow we found g = 0.5611 and
k = 0.701, which is very similar to the indexes calculated for
USA: g = 0.54− 0.6 and k = 0.69− 0.71 [14]. We have also
detected that the results do not vary much when the size of the
network is increased to 1000.
A. Dynamical behaviour
As for the dynamical behaviour of trading there are data
available for the wealth share of various countries [15]. In
Fig. 10 we show the top 1, 5, and 10% countries’ income
share, and compare it with the numerical calculations for a
network size of 500 agents. All the calculations were set to
run up to 200000 iterations, of which only half of them were
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FIG. 8: (a) Histogram of the annual salary of european people (in
red) compared with a numerical calculation without including trust in
a system with 1000 agents (blue). (b) Same as (a), but the calculation
was performed in a system with 250 agents. (c) Histogram of the
salary of players in the NFL in 1998 (in red), compared with results
from the model without including trust effects. (d) Histogram of the
salary of players in the NFL in 2011 (in red), compared with results
from the model including trust effects.
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FIG. 9: Lorentz curves from our calculations for several values of
the spread of prices. The straight black line corresponds to perfect
equality. The curve indicated by the arrow matches with real data.
This corroborates our claim that trading without trust makes wealth
distribution skewed or unequal.
selected for the comparisons. The parameters of the model ds
and t0 were varied to find the best fit.
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FIG. 10: Comparison between numerical results and actual data of
the top 10 % income share with data taken from ref.[15] for six se-
lected countries.
For all the cases a value of t0 = 400 in the model calcu-
lation is found to fit well with the data, except in the case of
Italy, where we chose t0 = 600 for the best fit. It is inter-
esting to notice that the case of China is the only one that fits
better with the 100000 initial iterations of the calculation, and
the dispersion of prices is smaller (ds = 0.15). All the other
countries are best fitted once the variables attain a final distri-
bution, which occurs during the last 100000 iterations. This
could reflect the fact that China is a newly emergent economic
power and that their rules of trading are tighter. For Japan
and Australia the dispersion of prices is larger than for China
(ds = 0.2). This could be interpreted such that these coun-
tries have more free trading rules, in which case one could
vary prices more widely without loosing competitiveness.
For developed countries with long history in economic tra-
ditions, ds = 0.4 is quite large, probably reflecting the in-
fluence of many strategies to allow prices to vary without the
loss of competitiveness. For instance the dispersion of gas
prices nationally in the USA ranges from 1.31 to 2.37 dollars
per gallon, and the prices are unevenly distributed geograph-
ically [16]. Observe that USA and Canada are practicable
indistinguishable, which is to be expected as they are similar
and tightly linked. The case of Italy, the only European coun-
try selected, is interesting, since it is the only one in which
a good fit is obtained by increasing the time scale for price
changes. this seems to suggest that in Italy and similar Euro-
pean countries prices tend to change more slowly than in the
very dynamic American economies.
Interestingly, the fit for the 1% top population is not as good
as the others, meaning that our model predicts less extremely
rich people than in reality there is. The extreme social and
economic inequality of the present world is most likely due to
the fact that the economic alliances are not random (as in our
model) and impose some trading preferences, other than the
ones considered in our model. Also, our approximation of a
conserved system result in a constraint on the amount of goods
or money an individual could gather, and this constraint is not
present in the actual economic picture, in which money could
be printed and goods could be produced and destroyed. In the
real world countries cannot be considered as closed systems,
although the global economy could be considered as such.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion our agent-based trading model gives rise to
results that overall seem to compare very favourably with the
findings from the real data, even though the model takes into
account only a subset of the known factors affecting trading.
One striking result is the effect of trust in trading relations.
First of all, it was found that trust reinforces trading transac-
tions in such a way that the network with active links remains
fully connected when trust is included, and becomes a set of
disconnected graphs if it is not. Secondly, trust helps to make
society more even and it is seen that the distribution of wealth
is fairer when trust plays a role in trading. If trust is not in-
cluded then the society seems to have a number of poor people
in debt, unlike in a society with trust.
One important conclusion of this work is that even in the
simplified case of having a conserved system, agreement with
real data on the distribution of wealth is not only possible but
also quite good. This could be interpreted indicating that in-
cluding the production and deterioration of goods and money,
which is essential to the idea of creation of wealth [17], does
not seem to be a fundamental property of the economy in gen-
eral. Furthermore, as far as the distribution of wealth is con-
cerned, the fundamental issue seems to be the spread of prices,
rather than the production of wealth. It also turns out that
our model predicts inequality in a closed economy without
production from simple rules of buying and selling between
agents, which illustrates the fact that inequality can arise nat-
urally in a rudimentary economy.
It should be noted that contrary to the general trend in
classical economic models to consider various representative
classes of agents (consumers or producers) [19] we have here
considered a single class of heterogeneous trading agents. The
behaviour emerging from such economy is an aggregate of in-
dividual decisions. Hence it seems that an unbalanced econ-
omy emerges from particular decisions of individuals [18].
It is also important to recognise that the structure of real
trading networks is more similar to a scale free networks than
to random networks, which stays fixed during the dynamic
trading process. In order to test the effect of topologically
changing network structure we have introduced a rewiring
scheme in which the agents whose connections are not
working are deleted from the network, and new agents are
added following a scale free method. As a result we have
8found that the final network structure evolved after a long run
of the dynamics resembling roughly a scale free network. It
is found that the structure of the final network still depends
very much on the trust variable R, namely if R = 1 for
all agents, then agents that become ”hubs” at a certain time
are very likely to be deleted, and eventually the network is
fragmented into small isolated trading groups. On the other
hand, if one includes R in the dynamics, the hubs that are
formed remain trading and the network, although changing,
remains cohesive. The network that one obtains after many
rewiring processes has always all the links working perfectly
(black lines). However, the wealth distribution in the network
is very similar to the ones reported here without rewiring, and
thus we decided to leave the detailed study of the rewiring
problem for the future, since the above-described rewiring
scheme breaks the conservation of wealth, which is an
essential assumption in our current model. Our justifica-
tion to do so is that in the calculations shown here the time
span for transactions is not long enough to rewire the network.
As the main message of this work we would like to suggest
that in trade the prices seem to be the main cause of impov-
erishment. Wide spread of prices tends to augment the dif-
ferences between poor and rich people, and the results seem
much more sensitive to a change in the allowed spread of
prices than to the average price. Also we conclude that trust
seems to be important in regulating trading, since it is a way in
which agents decide to trade preferentially amongst the agents
they are linked with. In indiscriminate transactions without
including trust, the network turns out to be disrupted, while
with trust few links are always reinforced. In this way trust
could be considered to favour the appearance of monopolies,
since the agents that have a good history seem better off re-
gardless of the high prices and quality of goods, and are thus
in position of engulfing small traders.
As a final remark we could conclude that our simple model
conserving the amount of goods and money is able to repro-
duce some salient features found in trading networks, with the
additional advantage that we could fairly easily add new fea-
tures to the model and analyse them in depth.
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